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AGATHEISM: A JUSTIFICATION OF THE 
RATIONALITY OF DEVOTION TO GOD 
Richard E. Creel 
First I argue that evidentialism, fideism, and consequentialism are unsatis-
factory ways of evaluating the rationality of devotion to God. Next I argue 
that an adequate evaluation of the rationality of such devotion must be an 
axiological enterprise. But given the perfect-being conception of God as 
infinitely perfect goodness, it follows that no individual could be a greater 
good or would ensure greater good than God. Therefore, it seems rational to 
hope that and live as though God exists as long as there is no conclusive 
proof that God does not exist. 
I. Introduction 
My objectives in this paper are twofold: to critique three approaches to the 
evaluation of the rationality of devotion to God, and to develop and defend 
a fourth approach that I think has much to offer. Before proceeding to my 
critiques, here is how I will be using several key terms. 
The use of "God" that I shaH start out with is that which, broadly speaking, 
is found in the personalistic, monotheistic traditions of Judaism, Christianity, 
and Islam, according to which God is a personal being who created, sustains, 
and guides the universe. This is what Thomas Morris calls "the creation 
conception of God," as distinguished from "the perfect-being conception of 
God. "I I begin with the creation conception of God because it is that concep-
tion which enables many people to gain negative leverage on the question of 
the rationality of devotion to God. 2 Later I will give reasons for rejecting that 
conception and preferring the perfect-being conception. 
The concept I intend by "devotion" to God is that of a consciously God-
centered life that consists of endeavoring to live wholeheartedly according 
to the will and spirit of God as best one understands them, and ever endeav-
oring for a better understanding of them, such endeavor arising from gratitude 
and adoration. Theistic devotion is the self-conscious endeavor to enter and 
maintain-and perhaps more important, to re-enter and maintain-a right 
relationship to God. 3 
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II. Propositional Attitudes 
I should also say how I shall be using "knowledge," "belief," "faith," and 
"hope." In ordinary language these terms are interrelated so closely as to 
muddle philosophical as well as lay discussions. However, my primary con-
cern is not with these terms; it is with four concepts associated with them 
that I have found very useful when kept distinct. Consequently I will give 
these concepts sharp edges so that each of the preceding terms will be asso-
ciated with a distinct conceptual contribution, and so that together they will 
cover most of what I want to say about religious reasoning and devotion. 
By "knowledge" I shall in this paper mean knowing that one knows. The 
distinction between knowing and knowing that one knows is an important 
one that I accept, but it is the latter kind of know ledge, viz., the kind we know 
we have, that is our objective when we are, for example, examining or con-
structing arguments for or against the existence of God. Consequently, for 
the purposes of this paper I will use "knows that p" as synonymous with 
"knows that one knows that p."4 
"Belief," as I shall use the term here, consists of thinking that a proposition 
is true because of reasons or evidence which one thinks do not prove that the 
proposition is true but do indicate that it is probably true. 
"Faith," as I shall use the term here, is conceptually distinct from knowl-
edge and belief because although it is a conviction that p is true, it is a-con-
viction-not-derived-from-evidence-or-argument. In ordinary language "faith" 
is associated most closely with religious conviction, but the concept of faith 
I am using here is not limited in scope to religious conviction. In my sense 
one can have faith that a kidnaped child is still alive, that there is life on 
other planets, and that the laws of nature will not change. 5 
By "hope that p is true" I mean desire that p be true because one thinks 
that it would be good if it were true, and intention to make p true insofar as 
it is possible and appropriate. Sometimes hope does not motivate action 
because one thinks it impossible that one's action could contribute to the 
realization of what one hopes, e.g., that there is now life on another planet 
in our solar system. Regarding occasions on which one believes that one's 
action would contribute to the realization of what one hopes, we need to keep 
in mind that there are two very different kinds of thing that one might intend 
to realize by one's action. On the one hand, one's action might be intended 
to contribute to the actualization of a desired entity, as when one hopes that 
one can construct a house for oneself and acts on that hope. On the other 
hand, one's action might be intended to contribute to the actualization of a 
desired relation with an entity that one thinks exists, as when one writes and 
mails letters to one's mate, long held hostage by terrorists, in the hope that 
she is receiving them but without having any reason for more than a year to 
think that she is still receiving them, and having some reason to think that 
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she is no longer alive. Because action is motivated by desire and guided by 
knowledge, belief, and/or faith, I hope to show that hope can playa profound 
and pervasive role in motivating a rational religious life.6 
III. Rationality and Religious Devotion 
Now for my critique of three approaches to the evaluation of religious devo-
tion: evidentialism, fideism, and consequentialism. These terms, too, are in 
common use, but without standardized meanings, so again I plead for indul-
gence in the hope that my uses of these terms are sufficiently close kin of 
other uses to allow me into the family debate. My objective is to develop a 
typology that maps onto life in useful ways. 
A. Evidentialism 
The famous troika of John Locke, David Hume, and W. K. Clifford articulated 
the central thesis of evidentialism when they insisted that belief should be 
proportioned to evidence. In Clifford's exquisite words, "It is wrong always, 
everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence."7 
From that thesis, together with the point that it would be irrational to be 
devoted to something that one did not believe to exist, it follows that religious 
devotion is rational only if available evidence indicates clearly that there is 
or probably is a God. Hence, it is an evidentialist sentiment that sufficient 
evidence for belief that God exists is a necessary condition for rational de-
votion to God. Therefore, if one's research regarding the existence of God 
shows that the probability of the existence of God is 50/50 or less, then it 
would be wrong for one to begin or continue to be devoted to God. 
B. Fideism 
Fideism does not agree with evidentialism that a positive balance of evidence 
that God exists is a necessary condition of a rational conviction that God 
exists. Fideism holds that it can be perfectly rational to affirm as true a 
proposition that one cannot prove or even show to be probably true. If this 
weren't so, it claims, we would all be hopelessly irrational because having 
such convictions is natural and inescapable in any viable form of human life. 
Among the most common of such convictions are "Physical objects are made 
of matter," "Other people have a SUbjective life," and "It is wrong to torture 
an infant." Faith that God exists, it is claimed, is also a rational conviction-
or at least can be. Hence, as long as we have epistemically responsible faith 
that God exists, we need not be deterred from devotion to God by inadequate 
or conflicting evidence, or by a negative balance of evidence regarding the 
existence of God.8 
To avoid some confusion, I note that there are two very different meanings 
of "faith." The first meaning is that which, rightly or wrongly, is associated 
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with S",ren Kierkegaard. According to this position, faith is an action, spe-
cifically, a free and unforced leap of affirmation. I will call this conception 
of faith "actional faith." 
Another prominent conception of faith views it as a passion, rather than an 
action. The flavor of passional-fideism, as I shall call it, has been captured 
superbly by David Hume. Hume says that evidence from our own senses is 
the most powerful kind of evidence that we can have and that everything else, 
such as memory and the testimony of other people, shades off quickly from 
there. Hence, religious doctrines, such as the resurrection of Jesus, that have 
been transmitted from the remote past and contradict experience and com-
monsense would never be held were they not "brought home to everyone's 
breast, by the immediate operation of the Holy Spirit." Hume goes on to say 
of the Christian religion that, "Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of 
its veracity: And whoever is moved by Faith to assent to it, is conscious of 
a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of 
his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most 
contrary to custom and experience. "9 I think Hume was wrong to say that 
Christian faith subverts the principles of human understanding. One can have 
Christian faith and be epistemically astute. 1O Moreover, one might in faith 
hold something to be true which in no way is "contrary to custom and expe-
rience"; e.g., one who is lost in a forest at night might have passional faith 
that she will be found unharmed. However, I think Hume was correct that 
passional-faith occurs independently of the machinery of evidential justifica-
tion and so is something that happens to one-whether or not by action of 
the Holy Spirit. Passional-faith that God exists consists of a conviction that 
was not arrived at by means of reasoning or evidence and that may survive 
in spite of evidence that seems to count against its truth. It is this kind of 
faith that I shall be speaking of herein, ordinarily. 
However, even iffideism is correct that passional-faith that God exists does 
not need to be justified evidentially in order to be rational, that does not entail 
that devotion to God can be rational without being justified axiologicaLLy. 
Devotion is a form of action and so cannot be adjudicated adequately apart 
from a consideration of values. Hence, axiological justification of actional-
faith, which is a species of devotion, is called for even if evidential justifi-
cation of passional-faith is not. There is a clear difference of kind between 
being justified in having passional-faith that God exists and being justified 
in being devoted to God. One might have faith that God, the personal creator 
of the universe, exists, yet also conclude that devotion to God would be wrong 
because God is morally indifferent, monstrous, or in some other way unwor-
thy of devotion. Clearly, then, rational faith that God exists is not a sufficient 
condition of rational devotion to God. 
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C. Consequentialism 
In contrast to evidentialism and fideism, the consequentialist approach to the 
justification of religious devotion is axiological from the start: whether one 
should be religious, and if so, how, is to be determined by comparing the 
consequences of being religious and not being religious, and from comparing 
the consequences of being religious in this way rather than that way. Accord-
ing to consequentialism, it might be rational to be devoted to God even if 
there is not a preponderance of evidence in favor of God's existence, even if 
one does not have passional-faith that God exists, and, indeed, even if one 
has passional-faith that God does not exist. 
Perhaps the clearest example of religious consequential ism is Pascal's 
Wager. Whenever I present Pascal's Wager to my students, some of them 
always object to it immediately because it is such a transparently self-serving 
approach to the question of whether to devote oneself to God. It seems clear 
that a Pascalian consequentialist would 'devote' herself to God not out of 
reverence for God, but, rather, for the sake of achieving an end, such as 
avoidance of hell or enjoyment of heaven. Moreover, a clear implication is 
that if a consequentialist theist were to decide later that she had found a better 
deal elsewhere, she would promptly take it and tum away from God, who 
from the consequentialist point of view is only a means to an end. 
Hence, consequentialism makes an absolute of something other than God, 
viz., whomever or whatever is the intended beneficiary of the consequences 
of one's being religious, and it subordinates to that beneficiary everything 
else, including God. 11 But that seems to show that consequentialism is not 
even compatible with devotion to God. It is a way of life that is a competitor 
to religious devotion, so it cannot serve as a measure of the rationality of 
religious devotion. Rather, the rationality of these two ways of life must be 
judged by a higher criterion. 
In conclusion, evidentialism is correct that we have moral obligations re-
garding our beliefs and our use of the term "belief," but-for reasons soon 
to be stated-I think it would be wrong to hold that the rationality of devotion 
to God turns upon the strength of one's evidence concerning the existence of 
God (unless, of course, one believes one's evidence proves that there is no 
God); fideism claims that affirmation of the existence of God need not be 
justified by evidence in order to be rational, yet even if that is true, faith that 
God exists is not a sufficient condition for rational devotion to God; con-
sequentialism is wrong to hold that the rationality of religious devotion turns 
upon its consequences for the devotee, but it is right that evaluation of 
religious devotion is an axiological affair. Building on the last point, I tum 
to my second objective, viz., development of a fourth approach to evaluation 
of the rationality of religious devotion. 
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D. Agathism & Agatheism 
Development of this alternative will be facilitated by the introduction of two 
words, "agathism" and "agatheism." I shall use "agathism" to refer to the 
doctrine that one ought to endeavor always with all of one's heart, soul, mind, 
and strength to understand what is the highest good and to be devoted whole-
heartedly to it. If one thinks that the highest good is a natural possibility, such 
as world-wide communism, then one ought to be devoted to actualizing that 
possibility; if one thinks that the highest good is a supernatural actuality, such 
as God, then one ought to be devoted to being related rightly to that actuality. 
Agathism is explicitly axiological and agrees with consequentialism that 
the proper court for evaluation of the rationality of religious devotion is not 
the court of existential evidence but the court of axiological consideration. 
But agathism does not agree with consequential ism that consequences are the 
criteria of the rationality of religious devotion, or of any other way of life. 
Agathism holds that the rationality of devotion is determined solely by the 
intrinsic goodness of the object of devotion-a point to which we will return. 
I shall use "agatheism" to refer to that species of agathism which holds that 
the highest possible good, and therefore that to which we ought to be devoted, 
is a unique, supremely perfect personal being, who is most fittingly called 
"God." In this "perfect-being conception of God," the idea that conceptually 
determines everything else about God is that God is perfect goodness. 
To the agathist, then, the good life is a life devoted to the good, or more 
precisely, to that good than which none greater can be conceived; to the 
agatheist, the good life is a life devoted to God, who is that good than which 
none greater can be conceived. Now for some thoughts about how one might 
justify the doctrine of agatheism. 
IV. God as Uniquely Worthy of Devotion 
For more than 2000 years the nisus of middle-eastern and western thought 
about God has been to conceive of God as the highest possible being, the 
supremely perfect being, the being than which none greater can be conceived. 
Part of the work of philosophical theology has been to examine that concept 
for intelligibility and coherence and to draw out its implications as to which 
attributes do not apply to God, which do, and how those that do should be 
conceptualized. 12 This project was clearly at the heart of Gordon Kaufman's 
book The Theoiogicailmagillation, which is subtitled, Constructing the Con-
cept of God. In that book Kaufman says, "God is the perfect attachment-figure 
to whom one's absolute loyalty and devotion can and should be given .... "13 
What I want to say proceeds in that tradition, which Thomas Morris calls "the 
Anselmian tradition" or "perfect being theology." 
My foundational point is that a supremely perfect being must also be 
supremely perfect goodness. I have spoken a great deal about goodness, and 
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the concept of goodness is at the heart of my paper, so what do I mean by 
"goodness"? I wish I could say in good conscience, "It's a simple property 
that cannot be defined. You know what it means or you don't." But I cannot, 
so I will say something briefly now and hope to pursue the issue more fully 
in a subsequent paper. 
To me it has been illuminating to explore Thomas Aquinas' conviction that 
being and goodness are the same in reference but different in meaning, even 
as "The Morning Star" and "The Evening Star" are the same in reference but 
different in meaning. Nothing can be good apart from actuality, and nothing 
can be actual without being good. From those convictions, which I will not 
defend now, I infer that supremely perfect being is identical with supremely 
perfect goodness, and vice-versa. 14 Moreover, it seems to me that a supremely 
perfect being would be infinitely perfect goodness, and that infinitely perfect 
goodness would be a person who is not characterized by envy or cruelty or 
indifference to the welfare of others, but, rather, by fairness, graciousness, 
justice, mercy, compassion, and agape love. 
It is crucial here to keep in mind that moral goodness is not the only kind 
of goodness; power and knowledge are also goods. Consequently, in order 
for a being with moral attributes to be supremely perfect, those attributes 
must be complemented by the attributes of perfect knowledge and perfect 
power. A perfectly loving being who was ignorant of what love called for or 
was impotent to do what love called for would not be infinitely perfect 
goodness and therefore would not be a supremely perfect being. 
It also seems clear that infinitely perfect goodness could not exist merely 
as an unactualized possibility or a Platonic form or a concept in human minds; 
rather, it must exist as a fully actual individual. Hence, being actual, as well 
as omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent, is a necessary condition of 
being infinitely perfect goodness, i.e., of being God. 
V. The Rationality of Devotion to God 
I think that the concept of a supremely perfect being is intelligible and 
coherent, and I believe that this being, and this being alone, would be worthy 
of unqualified devotion. Any lesser being would be less worthy of such 
devotion because it would be less good in some respect. 
One reason to hope that there is such a being is because if there is, then 
reality is all the more wonderful for including an individual than which none 
greater can be conceived. Such a hope seems analogous to hoping that reality 
includes mineral, plant, and animal life even more wonderful than that of 
which we are already aware-or, perhaps better, includes forms of life that 
are as much more wonderful than animal life than animal life is more won-
derful than plant life. Another reason for hoping that there is a God is because 
if there is a God, then in spite of the fact that there seem to be possible worlds 
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that are too meaningless or horrible to be worthy of existence, this world is 
not one of them, as God would not create or allow a world that was not 
sufficiently good to be worthy of existence. 15 
To be sure, to hope that God exists is not to know that God exists, and 
religious devotees should be responsive to arguments which claim to prove 
that there is no God, but they need not be concerned about probability or 
plausibility arguments against the existence of God. 16 Those who conceive 
of God as infinitely perfect goodness will, as long as they rationally think it 
possible that there is a God, be quite rational in continuing to hope that God 
exists. What could be more wonderful than that supremely perfect goodness 
be actual? How could it be irrational to have and maintain such a hope? It 
seems axiomatic that the better a possibility is, the better it would be if it 
were actual. If that is true, it seems eminently rational to hope that that 
possibility than which none greater can be conceived, viz., God, is actual. 
Even if you agree that it is rational to hope that there is a God, you still 
might want to know how in the absence of evidential probability that there 
is a God it could be rational to live as though there were a God, so let's 
consider an analogy that does not involve God. It would not be irrational for 
me to continue to search a lake and its environs for a child that I concede, 
along with everyone else, has almost certainly drowned. If you ask me if I 
believe that the child has drowned, then I will say "yes" -but I will add that 
I hope that my belief is false and that I think that my continued efforts to 
find the child alive are justified by the great good that would obtain were I 
to succeed. 
Consider also that the more probable nuclear war becomes, the harder we 
should work to prevent it-even if it becomes improbable that we can suc-
ceed. The justification of sllch behavior in spite of daunting odds would be 
the evil that would be averted and the good that would be achieved if we 
succeeded. 
To be sure, if someone proves to our satisfaction that Sllccess in these 
matters is impossible, then it would be irrational for us to pursue it. Convic-
tion that an end is impossible to achieve precludes rational efforts to achieve 
it. But short of that extremity, there is a kind of sliding scale or correlation 
between how good something would be and how justified we would be in 
being devoted to it in spite of unfavorable odds. Hence, devotion in spite of 
highly unfavorable odds is not necessarily irrational. Indeed, such devotion 
might be the height of rationality-as it is, I think, in the case of those people 
who are desperately trying to save our natural environment in spite of a 
decreasing probability that they can succeed. In brief, adequate evaluation of 
the rationality of action inescapably involves axiological considerations, and 
the more important something is, the more justified one is in being devoted 
to it. 
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An obvious disanalogy between the preceding examples and the case of 
religious devotion is that our actions can make a difference to whether an 
endangered child is saved or nuclear war is averted, but they will make no 
difference to whether there is a God. Recall, however, that in addition to 
actions that save, maintain, or produce an entity or state of affairs that is 
intrinsically good, such as a child or world peace, there are actions that are 
intended to maintain or actualize a right relation to an actual good (or what 
is thought to be an actual good). Devotion to God belongs to this second type 
of action. 
If there is a God, then it seems plausible that the highest level of being for 
a creature is to exist in a right relation to God, who is supreme goodness. For 
a rational creature that would involve knowing God in one's mind, acknowl-
edging God in one's heart, and honoring God in one's actions. If there is no 
God but only a concept of God, then still, it seems to me, as long as we do 
not know that there is no God, the life than which none better can be lived 
by a human being is a life lived as though there is a God. Why? Because such 
a life would involve an ongoing effort to conceive of the highest good and 
to live according to it. 
Clearly, however, it can be or become irrational to pursue an improbable 
objective. If a person urgently needs $10, it would be irrational for her to bet 
her only $10 to win $15 with a 2 out of 5 chance of winning. Also, if 
continuing to search for a child which has almost certainly drowned would 
seriously endanger the lives of other people for whom one is responsible, 
then although one may continue to hope that the child is alive and will return 
safely, one should not continue to search. 
Isn't there also going to be a point beyond which the improbability of the 
existence of God rationally precludes devotion to God? For two reasons, I 
do not think so. First, if one accepts the principle that I argued for earlier, 
viz., that it can be rational to pursue an end even when one believes that it is 
not probable that a necessary condition of achieving that end obtains, then 
we must allow prima facie the possibility that it is not irrational to be devoted 
to God when one thinks it is not probable that God exists. Allowing this means 
that there cannot be a clean evidential cut-off point, such as not probable 
(50% or less) or improbable (less than 50%), at and below which it is irra-
tional to be devoted to God. No lower number short of 0% would seem to 
objectively obligate cessation of devotion. 
If the preceding is correct, my critic might respond that devotion is one 
among a set of mutually exclusive alternatives. If we choose devotion to God, 
it is at the expense of something else. Consequently, when the probability of 
the success of religious devotion is sufficiently low because of the low prob-
ability of the existence of God, then the higher probability of achieving some 
other good which is incompatible with devotion to God might render irratio-
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nal the choosing of devotion to God over that other good. By comparison, if 
the probability is very high that John, age 95, is brain dead, and the proba-
bility is very high that Jack, age 5, can be saved by an operation and return 
to a normal life, but neither of them can survive without the aid of a machine 
that can serve only one of them, then it would be irrational to take Jack off 
the machine in order to save John. Similarly, if a person believes that the 
probability that she can enjoy a certain good is higher than the probability 
that she can have a right relation to God (because she thinks that the proba-
bility that God exists is low), wouldn't it be irrational for her to choose the 
good of a right relation to God over the other good? 
If we approach this question quantitatively, then presumably for each al-
ternative we need to multiply the evidence factor by the value factor and 
prefer that alternative with the highest probability/value product. But God is 
infinitely good, so any positive evidential decimal number, no matter how 
small, multiplied by infinity will be larger than any positive evidential deci-
mal number multiplied by a finite number (to represent the finite good that 
is the alternative to God), no matter how large. Hence, it does not seem 
irrational to place a right relation to God ahead of every other good. 
Furthermore, the insistence that we must choose between God and other 
goods is a false dilemma because being rightly related to God is compatible 
with any other good which is worthy of choice; indeed, a right relation to 
God would seem to be the best way of ensuring that one is rightly related to 
other goods. For example, it might seem that there could be a conflict between 
how one relates to God and how one relates to one's children (e.g., neglecting 
one's children for religious reasons), but this, too, turns out to be a false 
dilemma because of God's will for those children. 
More generally, it is by our understanding of God that we should discern 
how we should relate to God and others.17 Moreover, as long as we do not 
know for certain that God does not exist, it seems impossible that there could 
be an obligation which would rationally preclude devotion to God conceived 
as supreme goodness. To be sure, our existential beliefs should be determined 
by our evidence, but our actions should be oriented to the good. A critic might 
ask, "But don't we have an obligation to live our lives according to how 
actuality probably is and not merely according to how we would like it to 
be?" Yes and no. In what way and to what extent we should take existential 
probability into account is an axiological matter. Agatheism does not involve 
a disregard for reality, but it recognizes that values playa critical role in the 
determination of rational action. 
Perhaps the last point puts into relief a watershed between two approaches 
to life: the one approach says that in order to act rationally we must first 
determine what reality is or probably is (in the pertinent respects) and then 
the values we act on should be tailored to that picture of reality; for example, 
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if it does not seem to a person that there probably is a God, then that person 
should act only on values that are not predicated on the concept of God. The 
other side says that rational action is primarily value driven so that to act 
rationally consists primarily of acting so as to promote what one considers 
to be the greatest good in the situation. Hence, how the relevant existential 
probabilities are to be taken into account is itself an axiological issue, as is 
indicated by the examples of the lost child and the prospects of nuclear war 
and ecological disaster. It could be rational to pursue the child, world peace, 
and a sound ecology in spite of the improbabilities of success, and it could 
be rational to pursue a right relation to God in spite of its appearing improb-
able that God exists. 
In brief, it is the belief of the agatheist that the concept of God is the most 
adequate concept of the supreme good and that, therefore, if God exists, then 
the best thing for any of us is to be rightly related to God. If God does not 
exist, then the agatheist is nonetheless living a rational life by endeavoring 
to live according to the greatest good that she can conceive. 
It is important to note that according to agatheism God is worthy of devo-
tion not because he can do us the most good, though he can, but simply 
because he is the most good-indeed, is unsurpassable goodness and there-
fore is uniquely worthy of unqualified awe, adoration, and allegiance. That 
is why agatheism is not a form of consequentialism. The devotion of the 
agatheist is not for the sake of a consequence of the devotion; it is because 
the devotion is right in itself. 
Still, insofar as we are concerned that history not be meaninglessly painful 
and tragic, it seems to me that it is rational to hope that there is a God, for 
in so hoping we would be hoping that there is someone who can and will 
redress and redeem as much as is possible the injustices and cruelties of 
history. IS Not to hope that there is a God seems to me presumptuous or 
callous-as though one thinks one knows that the injustices and cruelties of 
history cannot be redressed or as though one doesn't care whether they are 
redressed. To hope that there is not a God seems to me monstrous-as though 
one approves and applauds the sufferings and severed lives of others, e.g., 
families that have been traumatically separated by slavery or terrorism, and 
individuals who have been struck down before or during their creative 
prime. 19 
As is obvious and was noted earlier, our hoping will make not a bit of 
difference to whether there is a God. Rather, religious hoping is expressive 
of what one thinks is or would be the highest good. Does this mean that 
religious hope will end in idle sentiment? that the religious devotee will spend 
her life praising God and neglecting God's creatures? Not at all. It seems to 
follow from the concept of God as infinitely perfect goodness that God loves 
his creatures and desires their welfare. To be sure, if God exists, then God is 
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the greatest actual good. However, the Kingdom of God, i.e., a community 
of creatures who are in a right relationship with God and therefore with 
one another, is the greatest potential good. Hence, whereas hope that God 
exists cannot rationally motivate us to do anything to make it true that 
God exists, it should motivate us to do all we can to actualize the Kingdom 
of God. 20 
Consequently, it is intriguing that David Hume, who has shaken the belief 
of so many theists, was, I think, right or very close to right in suggesting that 
..... the most genuine method of serving the divinity is by promoting the 
happiness of his creatures." Martin Buber and Philip Phenix expressed a 
similar sentiment by saying that we serve God best by building community.21 
Even if the classical conception of God is correct that God needs nothing 
from us and therefore wants nothing from us for himself, that does not mean 
that God wants nothing from us. Reason and scripture testify independently 
that God, a perfectly good person, wants us to promote the well-being of 
ourselves and others. Insofar as God wants us to be devoted to himself, it is 
not because he needs devotion; it is because he knows that our fulfillment 
lies in a right relationship to him. It seems, then, that the ethical implications 
of agatheism include all that is best in humanistic ethics and then some, as 
the God of whom I speak is the just but wise and loving sovereign of all. By 
the grace of such a God and in God's Kingdom all worthy humanistic ideals 
will be fulfilled, including freedom, justice, beauty, truth, and compassion. 
The concept of God, then, is the concept of the greatest possible individual; 
the concept of the Kingdom of God is the concept of the greatest possible 
society that includes free creatures. God is either actual or impossible. If God 
is actual, then the Kingdom of God is possible-but potential rather than 
actual. We cannot actualize God, but we can help actualize the Kingdom of 
God. Given the nature of that kingdom, surely it is rational to hope it is 
possible and to do all we can to actualize it on earth as fully as we can while 
calling on God's grace for guidance, strength, forgiveness, and transforma-
tion-recognizing that God alone can take his kingdom to completion.22 
I would like to focus what I've been saying by adapting a point from S"ren 
Kierkegaard, who said that what oxygen is to breathing, possibility is to hope. 
The most important possibility, I submit, is the possibility that there is a God. 
If there is a God, then the conditions for maximal creaturely good are opti-
mal-at least so far as they are not dependent on the free choices of creatures. 
For this reason the agatheist need not feel troubled by the flitting specter of 
Great Pumpkin arguments which claim that allowing hope to be based on 
mere possibility would open a Pandora's box of silly and irrational hopes. In 
hoping that God exists, the agatheist is hoping that something exists which 
subsumes all other goods and ensures that creaturely goods will be optimized 
to the extent that free creatures are devoted to God. 
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In conclusion, when God is thought of as infinitely perfect goodness, it 
seems consummately rational to hope that there is a God and to live as though 
there is, as long as there is no conclusive proof that there is not. Until such 
a proof is produced, it seems to me that Blaise Pascal was correct when he 
said: " ... there are two kinds of people one can call reasonable; those who 
serve God with all their heart because they know Him, and those who seek 
Him with all their heart because they do not know Him. "23 
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